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CLASS PRICING
Abstract
A contract with K-class pricing divides a large set of goods or services into K
classes and assigns a single price to any element of a class. Class pricing can be efficient 
when several different versions may be traded and it is costly to assign individual prices 
to all of them. It is more likely to be used when the number of buyers is smaller, the 
number of versions is larger, the variance in costs is smaller, and demand ex ante differs 
less between versions. Under simple conditions classes should be designed to minimize
the sum of squared within-class cost deviations. In bilateral trades, the most efficient 
game form is that in which classes are designed by the player with less varied gains from 
trade, while the traded version is chosen by the other player. Decisions are thus made by 
the player who cares most about them, while the opponent prescribes a set of limits.
3I. INTRODUCTION
Jelly Beans are sold by weight and the buyer can decide on the mix of flavors, 
college tuition does not depend on the courses taken by the student, a haircut can be as 
the customer “likes it”, a fast-food hamburger can include any number of napkins and 
condiments picked up by the guest, a stay at an “all inclusive” resort may take an infinite 
number of forms. Along similar lines, a food-service contractor is allowed several 
substitutions by the “seasonal vegetables” language of the contract, and employees will 
perform any of a large set of tasks as requested by their bosses. The above are examples 
of what we will call “one-class pricing”. It is absurdly expensive to determine a price for 
each of the possible versions of the goods (or services) mentioned, so one player (often 
the seller) groups the versions into a class, a single price applies to all elements in the 
class, and other player decides which is traded. We can more generally think about “K-
class” pricing in which the versions are grouped into K classes with K different prices. 
Examples of this include different prices for different types of candies, different fees to 
cut longer or shorter hair, and higher wages for overtime or hardship. The canonical 
example is, of course, the “5 and 10” stores.  
In the present paper we attempt to rationalize the existence and properties of class 
pricing. We offer results on the determinants of class prices, the number of classes used, 
how versions are grouped into classes, and who should design the classes. First, and not 
surprisingly, class prices are increasing in average class costs and demands. Second, 
fewer classes are used when the number of buyers is smaller, the number of versions is 
larger, the variance in costs is smaller, and demand ex ante differs less between versions.
Third, sellers will define classes by cost/demand-intervals: if one high and one low 
4cost/demand version are in the same class, then all versions with intermediate 
cost/demand will be included. In a simple but natural case, we find that the profit 
maximizing class intervals are those that minimize the sum of squared within-class cost 
deviations (holding the number of classes constant). Fourth, in bilateral trades, it is most 
efficient if the classes are designed by the player with less varied gains from trade, while 
the traded version are chosen by the other player. The ultimate decision right is given to 
the player who cares the most, but the opponent can constrain the amount of discretion 
yielded. 
Throughout the paper, we take as a premise that pricing costs are subject to 
economies of scale, such that the cost of assigning a single price to a class of versions is 
lower than the cost of pricing all the versions one-by-one. Since the vast majority of 
economic models are based on the assumption that pricing is free in the first place, our 
premise rests on controversial grounds. At issue is not whether pricing actually is 
completely costless, but whether these costs are large enough to have important 
implications. The paper addresses this underlying controversy by assuming, arguendo, 
that pricing is costly, and deriving some implications thereof. 
Once we provisionally accept that pricing is costly, it is quite natural to assume 
that these costs are subject to economies of scale, at least in markets where prices are 
posted. Depending on the source of bargaining costs, economies of scale may be less 
clear if prices are arrived at through bargaining, particularly since one could imagine that 
players would tolerate costs in proportion to stakes. However, most people will find it 
plausible that a single $30,000 deal could be negotiated in less time that thirty $1,000 
deals. 
5Literature
In the seventy years since Coase argued that “there is a cost of using the price 
mechanism” (1937, p. 390), the literature has identified several such costs. However, 
instead of focusing on costs that are “common”, there has been a preference for costs that 
are “large” (such as the threat of hold-up). As suggested by the examples in the 
Introduction, class pricing is a widely observed phenomenon, but one of Cents rather than 
Dollars. Any convincing explanation must rely on what has been called the “mundane” 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 105) costs of pricing; the common but small costs associated with 
any price determination process, such as bargaining or take-it-or-leave-it offers. 
In the broader economics literature, we find the most important use of “common 
but small” pricing costs in macro-economic works on the dynamic implications of menu-
costs (Mankiw, 1985). The general idea in this literature is that pricing costs lead to 
sticky prices and that the resulting incomplete equilibration can provide a micro-
foundation for Keynesian macroeconomics (Blinder et al., 1998). One can look at this 
literature as aiming to explain why prices are coarse over time, rather than across 
products (as is our focus here).
The optimality of cross-sectional class pricing has received significant attention in 
the context of screening models where it often is optimal to “bunch” several types into 
the same contract (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). There has been much less work justifying 
the phenomenon by the costs of detailed pricing. To the best of our knowledge, Seim and 
Viard (2006) and Wernerfelt (1997) are the only two papers to do so, and then only in 
rather narrow contexts.
6Outside the academic literature, the U. S. Supreme court has used pricing costs in 
a ruling about license fees. The American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 
which license the work of individual artists in the music industry, charges a blanket fee to 
bars, radio stations etc.. When the Columbia Broadcast System challenged this practice, 
the court found in favor of the defendant, arguing that “A middle man with a blanket 
license was an obvious necessity if the thousands of individual negotiations, a virtual 
impossibility, were to be avoided” (Broadcast Music Inc. vs. Columbia Broadcast 
System, p. 20). 
At a more abstract level, our characterization of the optimal composition of 
pricing classes leads us to minimize the same function as that minimized in a very 
commonly used computer science algorithm for optimal quantization (Gersho and Gray, 
1991) as well as in the statistical technique used in “k-means” clustering algorithms 
(MacQueen, 1967). 
Plan of the Paper
Since the cost of pricing is the controversial premise of the argument, we will 
devote the Section II to a discussion of the nature of these costs. The analysis will be 
presented in Section III, followed by a brief discussion in Section IV.
II. THE COSTS OF PRICING
Arguments about pricing costs are often objected to with proposals to use 
alternative trading mechanisms. Since no single class of pricing costs, such as those 
7incurred in connection with bargaining or signage, apply convincingly to all ways of 
determining prices, the players can avoid any specific problem by using some other 
mechanism.
We will here offer a four-pronged counter-argument. First, there are many types 
of pricing costs and the argument does not depend on any one type being important. 
Second, while the existence of mechanisms without pricing costs is a theoretical 
possibility, widely used practices, such as bargaining and take-it-or-leave-it (“posted”) 
offers, arguably entail several important types of pricing costs. Whatever the reasons for 
their use, the prevalence of these mechanisms makes it important to study the 
implications of the associated pricing costs. Third, and perhaps more speculatively, the 
existence of a cost-free mechanism is immaterial unless the players can use a cost-free 
mechanism to agree to use it. Fourth, even if pricing costs are unimportant in many 
applications, they could still be critical in others.
Aiming to make the first two prongs of the argument, we now offer a brief 
literature survey to document the existence and importance of several pricing costs 
associated with bargaining and posted price mechanisms.
Bargaining Costs
Some version of alternating offer bargaining is commonly used to determine 
prices under conditions with a flavor of bilateral monopoly. Examples include big ticket 
consumer goods, industrial products, employment contracts, and other services. Because 
the idea is to make a list of the costs associated with this price determination process, we
will group them in three categories.
81. Costs associated with the bargaining process itself. Any explicit model of 
alternating offer bargaining must posit some costs of refusing an offer and making a 
counter, since the process otherwise would go on ad infinitum. Delays are strictly out-of-
equilibrium outcomes in the most simple models (Rubinstein, 1982), but not in richer 
settings (Watson, 1998). 
Perhaps more importantly, it is obvious that bargaining often does take quite a bit 
of time in the real world. The costs of this time include the salary of bargainers, the loss 
from delays in trade, and the disutility many people feel from participating in the back-
and-forth process (think of asking for a raise or buying a car). At a more aggregate level, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (May, 2005) estimates that there are 69,300 Purchasing 
Managers in the US each making an average of $81,440 per year. Since a survey by 
Purchasing Magazine suggests that these managers spend 15% of their time on price 
negotiations, we can estimate that the firms employing them incur close to one billion 
dollars in direct negotiation costs.
2. Costs associated with the outcomes: It has recently been argued that any not-
ex-ante-agreed-upon outcome produces ill-will towards the trading partner and a 
reduction in gains from trade (Hart and Moore, 2008). More generally, players may 
experience lingering negative (and counter-productive) sentiments towards past 
bargaining opponents.
3. Costs incurred in anticipation of bargaining. It is well-documented that better-
informed bargainers get better results (Busse, Silva-Risso, and Zettelmeyer, 2006). While 
this result does not figure prominently in the theoretical literature, it is not hard to 
understand. The idea is that players, prior to bargaining, can invest to get information that 
9will help them in the bargaining process. Unless equilibrium investments equal collusive 
investments, there will be a distortion, i.e. a bargaining cost. In most cases it seems 
natural to assume that the cost comes in the form of both players over-investing in jointly 
wasteful information.
Consistent with the importance of anticipatory bargaining costs, the above-
mentioned survey of purchasing managers found that they spent about 25% of their time 
“Preparing Bids” and “Researching Prices”. At a more strategic level, players may refrain 
from suggesting improved trades in order to avoid bargaining or withhold information 
about such opportunities in order to protect their own future bargaining power (Simester 
and Knez, 2002).
Costs of Posting Prices
In situations where a single seller faces several buyers, it is common for the 
former to post a price which is understood to be a take-it-or-leave-it offer. I once again 
list several costs of the process.
1. Direct costs of posting a price. Levy et al (1997) estimate the direct costs of 
changing a supermarket price to be $.52. Depending on the setting, additional costs may 
be incurred in order to communicate the prices to buyers. In the case of a large industrial 
supplier, Zbaracki et al (2004) find that the firm’s total expense on pricing amounts to 
1.22% of revenues.
2. Seller costs of managing several different prices. It is not unheard of for 
retailers to put all products in a small number of price classes in order to keep operations 
as simple as possible (“5 and 10”, “Dollar Stores”). In the study of Zbaracki et al. (2004), 
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the costs of managerial information gathering, decision-making, and communication 
were much larger than the conventional menu-costs.
3. Buyers’ reactions to facing several different prices. Several laboratory studies 
have suggested that buyers may purchase more when faced with fewer price classes
(Chernev, 2006). A recent field experiment by Bertini, Frederick and Simester (2006),
yielded similar results and the authors attribute this to buyers’ aversion to making 
complex tradeoffs.
III. ANALYSIS
As noted in the previous Section, the costs of determining a price depend on the 
mechanism through which this is done e. g. by alternating offer bargaining or unilateral 
price posting. Since these costs contribute to the overall efficiencies of alternative price-
determination mechanisms, attempts to economize on them should ideally take the 
endogeneity of the mechanism into account. However, to the extent that the nature of 
pricing costs varies between mechanisms, it would be very hard to perform a comparative 
analysis. We will therefore sidestep the issue and focus the analysis on unilateral price-
posting only.
In our reduced form model, the cost of pricing is represented only by the total 
cost r that must be incurred on a per price basis. We endow the model with economies of 
scale by assuming that this cost is independent of the number of versions to which the 
price applies.
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0. Preliminaries.
The product comes in N possible versions, and if these are divided into K ≤ N
classes, the parties incur total pricing costs Kr. There is one seller (he) and B potential 
buyers (she), each of whom buys one or no units of the product. Versions are indexed by 
n or q = 1, 2, …, N, classes by k or j = 1, 2, …, K, and buyers by b = 1, 2, …, B. The set 
of versions in class k is Sk and we use pn to denote the price of version n, while p
k is the 
price for any version in class k. We will use the notation n  k as shorthand for n  Sk, 
such that n  k implies that pn = pk. 
To keep the effects of costly pricing separate from those of screening, we will 
assume that each buyer has very specific needs, such that only one version is “right” –
has positive value - for any specific buyer (cf. Aghion and Tirole, 1997). In this context, 
we start with the case in which versions have identical prior demands, but different costs. 
The second Sub-Section is focused on the opposite case with different prior demands, but 
identical costs; while we look at the general case, with differing costs and demands, in 
the third Sub-Section. In the fourth and final Sub-Section, we compare two game forms 
to ask whether buyers or sellers would design the classes most efficiently. 
1. Identical prior demands, different costs
The seller can produce the n’th version of the product for cn [0, 1] and buyer b
values this version at vnb [0, 1]. The seller knows these costs at the outset and we label 
the versions such that c1<c2<… < cN. All BN values are ex ante unknown to the seller, 
and because pricing takes time and it is important to trade quickly, he has to set prices for 
all versions before hearing from the buyers. For buyer b, only one version, indicated by 
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rb, is “right.”  Ex ante, all versions are equally likely to be right for b, and thus have 
probability 1/N of being so. The value of rb, vrb, is drawn from a commonly known
distribution F: [0, 1] → [0, 1], independent of costs and I.I.D. across buyers and 
versions. The buyer values all other versions at 0. We indicate “no trade” by the version 
label 0, and define v0b = c0 = p0 = 0. The addition of the no trade possibility means that 
the set of possible outcomes for a specific buyer can be described as an element of the set
{0, 1, 2…, N}.
 Except in Subsection 4, we assume that the seller designs the classes while the 
buyer selects the version to be traded. The sequence of events is:
1. The seller learns his costs (c1, c2,…, cN ) and each buyer learns her valuations 
(vb1, vb2,…, vbN)=(0, 0,.. , vrb, …, 0, 0).
1
2. The seller groups the N versions into K classes and sets a price for each class.
3. Each buyer picks the version she wants to trade, if any.
4. Trades and payoffs.
Pricing costs are incurred even if no trades take place and since the seller sets the 
prices unilaterally, we here charge all pricing costs to him. Analyzing the game 
backwards, buyer b selects version rb if vrb – prb>0 and otherwise makes no trade. To 
indicate the decisions made by buyers, we define B(N + 1) indicator variables such that 
tbq = 1 if buyer b makes trade q {0, 1, 2…, N} and tbq= 0 otherwise. So
                                      (tb0,  tbrb) = (0, 1) if vrb – prb>0,
(tb0,  tbrb) = (1, 0) if vrb – prb≤0, and 
tbq=0 if q≠0, rb.                                                                (1)
                                                
1 It will often be more natural to assume that the buyer learns his valuation ex interim, between 2 and 3, but 
the present formulation will give the same results and preserves symmetry between the players.
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In stage 2, the seller wants to find a number of classes K, a way to partition the N
versions into these classes, S = (S1, S2, …, SK), and a set of K prices to maximize the 
expected profits. With some abuse of notation, we use the MaxS operator as shorthand for 
the first two steps, such that we can write the seller’s problem as
                                        MaxS MaxpE ∑B ∑K ∑q  k (pk – cq)tbq - Kr,                              (2)
s. t. (1), Uk Sk = N, ∩j≠k Sk Sj = Ø, and Sk  ≠ Ø for all k.
While (2) in general is a very difficult problem, we have endowed it with sufficient 
structure to allow us to characterize the optimal solution in some detail.
First, since all buyers are ex ante identical, such that we can solve (2) at the level 
of a representative buyer, thus replacing the summation over B in favor of multiplication. 
Second, since all versions have identical prior valuations, the ex ante choice probabilities
depend only on p. All versions in a class will therefore have equal choice probabilities
and the seller’s expected per-buyer profits are ∑K (pk - ck)[1 –F( pk)]│Sk│/N – Kr/B,
where │Sk│ is the cardinality of Sk and ck is the average cost of the versions in it. The 
optimal prices are then given by 
pk* = ck + [1-F(pk*)]/f(pk*),                                       (3)
and the partitioning problem is
MaxS∑K [1 –F( pk*)]2│Sk│/[N f(pk*)] – Kr/B.                                (4)
s. t. (3), Uk Sk = N, ∩j≠k Sk Sj = Ø, and Sk  ≠ Ø for all k.
While we are unable to solve this problem analytically, we can characterize the solution. 
Proposition 1: If prior demands are identical, it is never profit maximizing to have 
classes with interlacing costs.
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Proof: If versions n and n + 2 are in class k, then version n + 1 should be in class k as 
well. To see this, note that if version n + 1 is in a higher priced class, it is traded with 
lower probability than version n + 2 implying that the seller could do better by switching 
the two versions. Similarly, if version n + 1 is in a lower priced class, it is traded with 
higher probability than version n. 
Q.E.D.
This immediately gives
Corollary 1: If prior demands are identical, the optimal classes can be defined by cost-
intervals and class prices increase as average class costs go up. 
Recalling that versions are labeled in order of increasing costs, we can label the classes 
such that the (average class) costs and profit maximizing prices pk* are increasing in k.
With these labels, if cq < cn, n k and q j, then j ≤ k.
We can offer a much stronger characterization of the solution if F is uniform. 
Finding 1: If F is uniform, the profit maximizing partition for a given K is that which 
minimizes the sum of squared within-class deviations in costs.2
                                                
2
For example, if (c1, c2,… , cN ) = (.01, .02, …[.01]N), where N<100, and we ignore integer problems, we 
can write (10) as  (N-K)r/B –(.0001)(N-2K)(N-K) /(12K2), and the optimal K is a root of  120000rK3-
BK2+3NBK-2BN2 =0. 
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Proof: By substituting in the optimal class prices, pk* = ½ + ck/2, we find the ex ante 
expected per-buyer profits as
                                    [1 + ∑K (ck)2│Sk│/N – 2∑Ncn/N]/4 - Kr/B.                                (5)
If K = N, (5) becomes [1 + ∑N (cn)2/N – 2∑Ncn/N]/4 - Nr/B, and we can express the net 
advantage of class pricing as
                                      (N - K)r/B – [ ∑N (cn)2 - ∑K│Sk│(ck)2]/N.                                  (6)
The first term in (6) reflects the saved pricing costs and the second the loss from less than 
optimal pricing of individual versions. The finding follows from rewriting (6) as
                                     (N - K)r/B – [∑K ∑n k (cn - ck)2]/N.                                            (7)
Q.E.D.
The criterion (7) appears in other fields as well. For example, both the “k-means” 
clustering algorithm (MacQueen, 1967) from statistics and a widely used “quantization” 
technique from computer science (Gersho and Gray, 1991) minimize the same criterion.3
In our case, we have an analytical proof that the procedure is optimal, although only in 
the knife-edge condition considered above.
Remark 1A. It is tempting to conclude that the profit maximizing K is smaller when the 
variance in costs is smaller, but one can easily construct examples in which this 
conjecture is false. For example, if c1 = c2 = .1 and c3  = c4  = .9, K will be at most 2, 
while c1 = .1, c2 = .4, c3 = .6, and c4 = .9 may lead to a larger K = 3 or 4, in spite of 
                                                
3
The object of quantization is to compress a finer scale into a smaller set of discrete categories, 
while retaining as much relevant information as possible and the object of clustering is to organize a set of 
elements into groups that are in some way similar.
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having lower variance. However, we can conclude that the seller is more likely to set K = 
1 when the variance in costs is lower.
Remark 1B. As can be seen from (7), the variance in values plays no role as long as all 
the values all are drawn from the same distribution. Suppose, however, that some 
versions, if “right”, have values drawn from a uniform distribution on [ρ, 1], where ρ 
[0, 1], while others have values drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1 - ρ]. In this 
case, the seller could reap larger benefits from putting the two types of versions in 
separate classes for larger values of ρ. So in this example, the profit maximizing K will be 
weakly larger if the ex ante variance in values is larger in the sense that the distributions
differ “more” between versions. (Formulation and demonstration of a more general result 
of this type is a topic for future research.)
The results obtained so far apply to the case in which all versions have identical 
prior demand, while ex post, each buyer assigns positive value to only one version. 
Continuing to maintain the latter feature (and thus ruling out screening); we now consider 
the case in which versions have different prior demands, but identical costs.
2. Different prior demands, identical costs
Formally, the seller can produce any of the N versions of the product for c [0, 
1] and buyer b values version n at vnb [0, 1]. For buyer b only one version, indicated by 
rb, is “right.”  As in Subsection 1, a buyer values all versions other than the one that is 
right for her at 0. Ex ante, all versions are equally likely to be right for b, and thus have 
17
probability 1/N of being so. If version n is right for b (such that rb = n), its value vrb is 
drawn from a commonly known distribution Fn: [0, 1] → [0, 1] I.I.D. across buyers. The 
family of distributions F1, F2, …FN satisfy a monotone likelihood ratio property such that
there exists a labeling for which 
fn+1(P)/fn(P ) ≥  fn+1(p)/fn(p)                                              (MLR)
for all (p, P)( [0, 1), (p, 1]) and any n {1, 2, …N - 1}. We will adopt those labels. 
The sequence of events is as in Subsection 1 and we can again represent the 
seller’s problem by (2). However, it is no longer true that all versions in a class have 
identical ex ante choice probabilities. Since the probability of  vrb – prb>0 is 1 –Frb( p
rb), 
the seller’s expected per-buyer profits are ∑K{ (pk - c) ∑ n k [1 –Fn( pk)]/N} – Kr/B.
The optimal prices are therefore given by 
pk* = c + ∑ n k [1 –Fn(pk*)]/∑ n k fn(pk*)                                       (8)
(such that pk* is increasing in k if K = N). The partitioning problem is
MaxS∑K {∑ n k [1 –Fn(pk*)]}2/{∑ n k fn(pk*)N} – Kr/B.                                 (9)
s. t. (8), Uk Sk = N, ∩j≠k Sk Sj = Ø, and Sk  ≠ Ø for all k.
The solution to this problem has characteristics analog to those of (4).
Proposition 2: If costs are identical, it is never profit maximizing to have classes with
interlacing prior demands. 
Proof: Suppose that version n + 1 is priced below version n, such that pn+1 = p and  pn = 
P, where p < P. The seller’s expected profit from these two versions is then
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[P - c][1 - Fn( P)] + [p - c][1 - Fn+1(p)]. This is higher than the profit from charging p
for both versions if 
[P - c][1 - Fn( P)] > [p - c][1 - F (p)],                                        (10)
and it is higher than the profits from charging P for both versions if
[p - c][1 - Fn+1(p)] > [P - c][1 - Fn+1( P)] .                                         (11)
Taken together (10) and (11) require that 
[1 - Fn(p)]/[1 - Fn( P)] < [P - c]/[p - c] < [1 - Fn+1(p)]/[1 - Fn+1( P)]                (12)
and that
[1 - Fn+1(p)]/[1 - Fn( p)] > [1 - Fn+1(P)]/[1 - Fn( P)]                          (13)
This again requires that the ratio [1 - Fn+1(x)]/[1 - Fn( x)] be decreasing in x [0, 1], such 
that 
d{[1 - Fn+1(x)]/[1 - Fn( x)]}/dx  < 0                                           (14)
or
fn(x)[1 -Fn+1(x)] <  fn+1(x)[1 - Fn(x)].                                              (15)
But this is inconsistent with (MLR), since we can rewrite (MLR) as
fn+1(P)fn(p ) ≥  fn+1(p)fn(P)                                                      (16)                                          
and integrate both sides over P from p to 1 to get
fn(p)[1 -Fn+1(p)] ≥  fn+1(p)[1 - Fn(p)].                                              (17)
QED.
This immediately gives
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Corollary 2: If costs are identical, the optimal classes can be defined by demand-
intervals and class prices increase as average class demand goes up. 
Combining the effects considered above, we next consider the case in which both 
prior demands and costs differ between versions.
3. Different prior demands, different costs
The assumptions in this subsection combine those in subsections 1 and 2. In particular, 
the seller can produce the n’th version for cn [0, 1] and buyer b values this version at 
vnb [0, 1]. For buyer b only one version, indicated by rb, is “right.” A buyer values all 
versions other than the one that is right for her at 0.  Ex ante, all versions are equally 
likely to be right for b, and thus have probability 1/N of being so. If version n is right for 
b (such that rb = n), its value vrb is drawn from a commonly known distribution Fn: [0, 1] 
→ [0, 1] I.I.D. across buyers. We assume that the vector of costs c1 , c2 ,… cN and the 
family of distributions F1, F2, …FN satisfy a monotone “scaled costs plus likelihood 
ratio” property in the sense that there exists a labeling for which:
[cn /p][Fn(P) –Fn(p)]/[1 - Fn(P)] - [1–Fn(p)]/[1 - Fn(P)] <
[cn+1/p] [Fn+1(P) –Fn+1(p)]/[1 - Fn+1(P)] - [1–Fn+1(p)]/[1 - Fn+1(P)]        (MSC+LR)
for all p [0, 1], all P [p, 1], and any n {1, 2,..N-1}. We will refer to these labels as 
“indices” of the corresponding versions. We adopt these labels.
The sequence of events is as in subsection 1 and we can again represent the 
seller’s problem by (2). Since the probability of  vrb – prb>0 is 1 –Frb( p
rb), the seller’s 
expected per-buyer profits are ∑K{ ∑ n k (pk – cn)[1 –Fn( pk)]/N} – Kr/B.
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The optimal prices are therefore given by 
pk* = {∑ n k cn fn(pk*) + ∑ n k [1 –Fn(pk*)]}/∑ n k fn(pk*),                           (18)
and the partitioning problem is
MaxS∑K{(∑ n k [1–Fn(pk*)])2/{∑n k fn(pk*)N} + 
{∑n k cn fn(pk*)∑ n k [1–Fn(pk*)]}/{∑n k fn(pk*)N} - ∑n k cn [1–Fn(pk*)]/N - Kr/B. (19)                              
s. t. (18), Uk Sk = N, ∩j≠k Sk Sj = Ø, and Sk  ≠ Ø for all k.
Proposition 3: It is never profit maximizing to have classes with interlacing index values. 
Proof: Suppose that version n + 1 is priced below version n, such that pn+1 = p and   pn = 
P, where p < P. The seller’s expected profit from these two versions is then
[P - cn][1 - Fn( P)] + [p - cn+1][1 - Fn+1(p)]. This is higher than the profit from charging 
p for both versions if 
[P - cn][1 - Fn( P)] > [p - cn][1 - Fn(p)],                                        (20)
and it is higher than the profits from charging P for both versions if
[p - cn+1][1 - Fn+1(p)] > [P - cn+1][1 - Fn+1( P)] .                                   (21)
Taken together (20) and (21) require that 
{1 - Fn(p) - [Fn(P) – Fn(p)] cn /p}/{1 - Fn( P)} < P/p
< {1 - Fn+1(p) - [Fn+1(P) – Fn+1(p)] cn+1/p}/{1 - Fn+1( P)}                (22)
But this contradicts (MSC+LR).
Q.E.D.
Corollary 3: The optimal classes can be defined by index-intervals and class prices 
increase as average class indices goes up. 
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We will now look in some detail at a simple example in which we can identify the 
most efficient allocation of roles between buyer and seller.
4. Finding the most efficient game form (division of roles between buyer and seller).
We have so far looked exclusively at the Seller-Design-Buyer-Choice game form,
in which the seller designs the classes and sets the prices, after which the buyer chooses
the version to be traded. We now want to investigate the optimality of this arrangement
when the two sides of the market are symmetric in the sense that there is a single buyer.
The most appealing candidate is the symmetric alternative in which the buyer designs the 
classes and sets the prices after which the seller chooses the version to be traded. 
There are, however, other possibilities as well. The two alternatives in which the 
same player designs and chooses are most easily thought of in a sequential sense in which 
(i) one player first designs the classes, (ii) the opponent then sets prices, and (iii) the first 
player finally chooses. In both of these cases, the design of the classes reflect private 
information (costs or values), which is not available to the player setting prices. The 
resulting jockeying for information-rents will burden both game forms with additional 
inefficiencies, and we will therefore ignore them in the following. The last two logical 
possibilities, in which the same player sets prices and chooses, are clearly very inefficient 
unless the opponent is given the right to refuse. Since this introduces factors not present 
in the simpler game forms, we will also ignore this last pair of alternatives.  
Aiming to keep the analysis simple, we look at a case with two versions and 
assume that costs that are binomial and I.I.D. across versions. In particular, values are γ
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[0, ½] or 1- γ, each with probability ½, and costs are 1/3 or 2/3, also each with probability 
½. Noting that the buyer’s valuations are more (less) varied than the seller’s when γ < 1/3
(γ > 1/3), we will evaluate the relative efficiency of alternative game forms for varying 
values of γ relative to 1/3. The cost of determining a price is r ≥ 0.
Recall that the sequence of events in Seller-Design-Buyer-Choice is as follows
1. The seller learns his costs and the buyer learns her valuations.
2. The seller groups the 2 versions into 1 or 2 classes and sets prices.
3. The buyer picks the version she wants to trade, if any.
4. Trades and payoffs.
We will compare the ex ante efficiency of this to the logical alternative, Buyer-Design-
Seller-Choice, in which
1. The seller learns his costs and the buyer learns her valuations.
2. The buyer groups the 2 versions into 1 or 2 classes and sets prices.
3. The seller picks the version she wants to trade, if any.
4. Trades and payoffs.
By proceeding mechanically and working through a lot of rather trite algebra, we
can derive an appealing result about the relative efficiency of the two game forms. In 
particular, we can show
Finding 4: For any r ≥ 0, the Buyer-Design-Seller-Choice is the more efficient game 
form when γ < 1/3, while Seller-Design-Buyer-Choice is more efficient when γ > 1/3.
Proof: See Appendix
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Since the seller’s (the buyer’s) valuation is relatively less variable exactly when γ
> 1/3 (γ > 1/3), this implies:
Corollary 4: Classes in bilateral trades should be designed by the player with the less 
variable valuations, while the version traded should be chosen by the player with the 
more variable valuations. 
Although classes in most examples are designed by the seller, the above result 
helps us make sense of this, and the exceptions. In particular, many incomplete contracts 
leave the give the seller latitude in determining the attributes about which the buyer cares 
little. For example, food-service contracts with the term “seasonal vegetables” give the 
seller some latitude to take advantage of market prices. Another example is home 
renovation contracts, which leave the contractor with the flexibility to make many minor 
decisions in light of local conditions. However, in most cases it is the buyer who cares 
more about which version is traded, and thus given the right to choose.
While this result has strong intuitive appeal and considerable face-validity, other 
factors may play a role in more general settings. Specifically, if trade is not bilateral, it 
might make sense if the players on the thin side of the market are allowed to design the 
classes.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have introduced the concept of class pricing as a response to the costs of 
assigning prices to large numbers of products. Class pricing is more likely to be used 
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when the number of buyers is smaller, the number of versions is larger, the variance in 
costs is smaller, and demand ex ante differs less between versions. Sellers will define 
classes by cost-intervals and in a simple but natural case, the profit maximizing class 
design is that which minimizes the sum of squared within-class cost deviations. In 
bilateral trades, the most efficient game form is that in which classes are designed by the 
player with less varied gains from trade, while the traded version is chosen by the other 
player. 
Once you start looking for it, class pricing is, as suggested by the examples in the 
opening paragraph of the paper, a very widely observed phenomenon. In many cases, 
(Jellybeans, haircuts, fast food,...) it is possible to argue that the aggregate implications of 
exactly identical prices are very similar to those of slightly differing prices. In other 
cases, (university educations, all-inclusive resorts,..) one could question the practice and 
probe its justification. Finally, there are some cases in which the implications are much 
less trivial.
It is possible to think of class pricing as an endogenously incomplete contract. We 
can define a very large set of versions by considering all levels of all attributes left out of 
the contract. Each of these attributes is often de facto left for a specific player to decide.
For example, in a home-renovation contract, it is understood that the buyer can select 
colors, while the seller decides on almost all hidden aspects of construction. According to 
the analysis presented here, these are attributes about which the deciding player cares the 
most. In contrast, the opponent is so indifferent that it simply is not worth it to negotiate 
different prices for all versions.4
                                                
4 Price negotiation may result if the opponent is not indifferent, but this is relatively rare.
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Let us now briefly discuss some important questions left for future research. First, 
since the models and examples analyzed here are quite special, it will be important to 
develop a more general version of the theory. The computational difficulties associated 
with the partitioning problem will likely prove a significant hurdle. However, if the 
computer science literature is a good analogy, one can hope to show that the solution 
from Finding 1: “Minimize the sum of squared within-class cost variations”, is 
approximately optimal in a larger class of problems. If so, it would be much easier to do 
further work in the area. Secondly, while we have assumed a single seller throughout, it 
would be interesting to look at competitive class design. Suppose that there are many 
sellers with privately known costs drawn from the same commonly known distribution. 
In this case, prices should go down, thus depressing the advantages of having more 
classes. If the per-seller costs of pricing stay the same, one would therefore expect fewer 
classes with more competition. Alternatively, a small number of sellers may be able to 
play an equilibrium in which they use different classes, allowing each to cater to its own 
market segment, much like in a model with spatial differentiation. Third, while we have 
focused on classes defined by identical unit prices, one could imagine a more general 
theory of classes defined by identical contracts. Employees work on hourly pay and most 
multi-product sales forces receive the same commission rate regardless of the product 
sold. This line may eventually lead to a theory of contractual simplicity. Fourth, one can 
not help but notice that the versions, in many of the examples given, are quite close 
substitutes. Since the current theory does not explain this, it may be possible to sharpen 
the argument. This would most likely require us to allow for ex post substitutability and 
thus introduce screening considerations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it would 
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be interesting to test some of the predictions made in the paper, perhaps by exploiting 
different pricing practices between countries or across different periods in history. 
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APPENDIX
Proof of Finding 5
In the following, Eπ denotes the seller’s expected profits, EU is the buyer’s 
expected utility, and EL is the amount by which the sum of these falls short of the first 
best. We proceed mechanically and compare the performance of the two game forms for 
γ < 1/3 and γ > 1/3.
Case 1: γ < 1/3, Seller-Design-Buyer-Choice.
For K = 2, the profit maximizing prices, associated efficiency losses, and profits prior to 
pricing costs, are: 
(p1, p2│c1 = c2 = 1/3) = (1 - γ, 1 - γ), EL = 0, Eπ = 1/2  - 3γ/4, 
(p1, p2│c1 = 1/3, c2 = 2/3) = (1 – γ - ε, 1 - γ), EL = 0, Eπ =5/12 -3γ/4,
 (p1, p2│c1 = c2 = 2/3) = (1 - γ, 1 - γ), EL = 0, Eπ =1/4 - 3γ/4.                             
For K = 1, the profit maximizing price, associated efficiency losses, and profits prior to 
pricing costs, are:
p1=1 - γ, EL = 0, Eπ are as if K = 2, except that Eπ =3/8 - 3γ/4 if c1 ≠ c2.
So the seller will ex ante prefer K = 2 if r < 1/48. However, the game form implements 
the first best for either value of K and thus for all values of r ≥ 0.
Case 2: γ < 1/3 Buyer-Design-Seller-Choice.
For K=2, the utility maximizing prices, associated efficiency losses, and utilities prior to 
pricing costs, are: 
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 (p1, p2│v1 = v2 = γ) = (0, 0), EL = 0, EU = 0, 
(p1, p2│v1 = γ, v2 =  1- γ) = (0, 1/3), EL = 1/6 - γ/2, EU = 1/3 - γ/2,
 (p1, p2│v1 = v2 = 1 - γ) = (1/3, 1/3), EL = 1/12 - γ/4, EU = ½ - 3γ/4,                             
If K =1, the utility maximizing price, associated efficiency losses, and utilities prior to 
pricing costs, are
(p1│v1 = v2 = γ) = 0, EL = 0, EU = 0.
(p1│v1 = γ,  v2 =1- γ)= 1/3, EL =1/8 - 3γ/8, EU = 1/8.
(p1│v1 = v2 =1- γ) = 1/3, EL =1/12 - γ/4, EU = ½ - 3γ/4.
So the seller will ex ante prefer K = 2 if r < (5 - 12γ)/48. However, the game form 
implements the first best for neither value of K and thus for no values of r ≥ 0.
Case 3: γ > 1/3, Seller-Design-Buyer-Choice.
For K=2, the profit maximizing prices, associated efficiency losses, and profits prior to 
pricing costs, are
(p1, p2│c1 = c2 = 1/3) = (1 - γ, 1 - γ), EL = γ/4 -1/12, Eπ =1/2 - 3γ/4
(p1, p2│c1 = 1/3, c2 = 2/3) = (1 - γ, 1) if γ (1/3, 4/9], EL= γ/2 - 1/6, Eπ =1/3 - γ/2
                                           = (γ, 1) if γ (4/9, 1/2], EL = 0, Eπ = γ - 1/3
(p1, p2│c1 = c2 = 2/3) = (1, 1), EL = 0, Eπ = 0.
If K = 1, the profit maximizing price, associated efficiency losses, and profits prior to 
pricing costs, are
(p1│c1 = c2 = 1/3) = 1 - γ if γ (1/3, 10/21], EL = γ/4 - 1/12, Eπ =1/2 - 3γ/4
                              = γ if γ (10/21, ½], EL = 0, Eπ  = γ - 1/3
(p1│c1 = 1/3, c2 = 2/3) = 1 - γ, EL = 1/24 - γ/8, Eπ  = 1/2 - γ
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(p1│c1 = c2 = 2/3) = 1, EL = 0, Eπ =0
So the seller will ex ante prefer K=2 if r < (3γ – 1)/12 and γ (1/3, 4/9], r < γ – 1/3 and
γ (4/9, 10/21], and if r < (27γ – 10)/48 and γ (10/21, 1/2]. However, the game form 
implements the first best for neither value of K and thus for no values of r ≥ 0.
Case 4: γ > 1/3, Buyer-Design-Seller-Choice
For K=2, the utility maximizing prices, associated efficiency losses, and utilities prior to 
pricing costs, are: 
(p1, p2│v1 = v2 = γ) = (1/3, 1/3), EL = 0, EU = 3γ/4 – 1/4
 (p1, p2│v1 = γ, v2 = 1 - γ) = (1/3, 1/3 +ε), EL = 0, EU = ¼ - γ/4
 (p1, p2│v1 = v2 = 1 - γ) = (1/3, 1/3), EL = 0, EU = 1/2 - 3γ/4.
If K = 1, the utility maximizing price, associated efficiency losses, and utilities prior to 
pricing costs, are
(p1│v1 = v2 = γ) = 1/3, EL= 0, EU =3γ/4 – 1/4
 (p1│v1 = γ, v2 = 1 - γ) = 1/3, EL= 0, EU =1/8
(p1│v1 = v2 = 1 - γ) = 1/3, EL= 0, EU =1/2 - 3γ/4
So the buyer will ex ante prefer K = 2 if r < (1 - 2γ)/8. However, the game form 
implements the first best for either value of K and thus for all values of r ≥ 0.
The desired result then follows by combining the results from the four cases.
Q.E.D.
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